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The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule:
A Response to "'Secondary' Relevance"
Paul R. Rice*
Observe everything
Inquire a lot
Criticize little
Chinese fortune cookie
In the spirit of this admonition I respond to a recent article ap-
pearing in this law review which was written by Professor David E.
Seidelson.' My comments are addressed to what I believe to be a
distortion of the concept that underlies the state of mind exception
to the hearsay rule. I propose to show that under the theory of
" 'secondary' relevance," Professor Seidelson so stretches this con-
cept on his procustean bed that he outprocrusts Procrustes.
Following a discussion of the rationale and limitations of the state
of mind exception, his article is substantially comprised of a series
of progressively difficult hypothetical situations through which he
illustrates its application.' The more complex and difficult hypo-
theticals present situations in which a declarant's state of mind is
proven, through utterances, for its circumstantially probative value
in establishing the objective facts that gave rise to the state of mind.
The Professor asserts that once it is assured, through circumstantial
evidence, that the existence of the state is "relevant" to proving the
objective fact, the statement that first tends to establish the state
of mind is admissible under a concept which he calls "'secondary'
relevance." 4
* B.B.A., Marshall University (1965); J.D., West Virginia University (1968); LL.M., Yale
University (1972); Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American
University. The author would like to express his appreciation to Mr. James Hosmer for his
research and editorial assistance.
1. Seidelson, The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 251
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Seidelson].
2. In Greek mythology, Procrustes was a giant of Attica who seized travelers and tied
them to an iron bedstead, after which he stretched his victims until they either became
dismembered or fit his procrustean bed.
3. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 255-66.
4. I.e., not directly relevant to the issue, but relevant because it tends to prove a fact
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To understand the import of Professor Seidelson's state of mind
analysis, we must begin with a discussion of logical relevance. The
definition thereof most likely to prevail in the future, and the one
which this paper will adopt, is that employed in the Federal Rules
of Evidence:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. 5
The object of proof in this definition, the fact which the offered
evidence is supposed to prove or disprove, must be found by the
court to be of a consequential nature.' This is one side of the logical
relevance coin. On the other side of the coin is the evidence that is
presented as proof of the consequential fact, which need only tend
to support a conclusion about the consequential fact.7 If this tend-
ency is found by the court, and if the evidence is otherwise admissi-
ble, it then becomes the responsibility of the finder of facts to esti-
mate the probative worth of that evidence. This will turn, in large
which, in turn, is directly relevant to the issue. Id. at 261. Professor Seidelson has suggested
that the degree of relevancy depends upon the extent to which the state of mind declarations
are factually well-founded. He concludes that
[iut is in these circumstances-where the declaration's relevancy is asserted not on a
primary, independent basis, but rather for the purpose of proving another admittedly
relevant fact and only to the extent that such "secondary" relevancy is factually well-
founded-that the test of relevancy becomes most difficult.
Id. at 262.
5. FED. R. Evio. 401.
6. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted the term "consequence" in rule
401 in an effort to avoid the construction problems and ambiguities inherent in the term
"material." That is, "[t]he fact to be proved may be ultimate, intermediate, or evidentiary;
it matters not, so long as it is of consequence in the determination of the action." FED. R.
Ev[D. 401, 28 U.S.C.A. App. (1975) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules) (em-
phasis added).
7. In support of this "tendency" definition, the Advisory Committee concluded that rele-
vancy is defined by the relationship between an item of evidence and a matter that is properly
provable in the case. "The rule [401] summarizes this relationship as a 'tendency to make
the existence' of the fact to be proved 'more probable or less probable.'" FED. R. EVID. 401,
28 U.S.C.A. App. (1975) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules). See also Caley
v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 330,73 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1961) ("evidence that has a legitimate
tendency to prove or disprove a given proposition that is material as shown by pleadings . ..
a tendency to establish a fact in controversy, or to render a proposition in issue more or less
probable"); State v. Wilson, 173 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1970) ("relevancy means the logical
relationship between proposed evidence and a fact to be established, the tendency to establish
a material proposition").
1976 State of Mind Exception
part, on the degree to which the fact finder is convinced of its
trustworthiness.
Relevancy, however, is only a threshold problem. It is a hurdle
over which all evidentiary offerings must pass to be admissible-but
only the first of many hurdles for some pieces of evidence which,
because of their nature, may detract from, rather than enhance, the
probabilities of accuracy and fairness.' Hearsay is one such exam-
ple.
Under the hearsay rule9 a statement made outside the court and
repeated in court by someone who heard it would be excluded be-
cause the degree of trustworthiness that must be present if the sub-
stance of the statement is to be accepted as true cannot reasonably
be evaluated. An accurate evaluation is impossible because there is
no effective way to test whether the statement was based on first-
8. A number of courts and textwriters have adopted the term "legal relevancy" to describe
the process of excluding evidence having probative value but which is outweighed by counter-
balancing factors of prejudice, confusion, surprise and undue time consumption. For exam-
ples of how the courts have balanced probative value against such dangers, see Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933); Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1963);
Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1962); Dankert
v. Lamb Fin. Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 499, 304 P.2d 99 (1965); Daniels v. Dillinger, 445 S.W.2d
410 (Mo. App. 1969); Hoag v. Wright, 34 App. Div. 260, 54 N.Y.S. 658 (1898).
9. There are a number of accepted definitions of hearsay worth noting:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out
of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter.
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 at 584 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMiCK].
FED. R. EVID. 801(c) provides:
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966) provides:
Hearsay evidence is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated.
Professor Morgan, in'The Hearsay Rule, 2 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1937), suggested that hear-
say generally be defined
so as to include (1) evidence of any conduct of a person, verbal or nonverbal, which is
intended to operate as an assertion if it is offered either to prove the truth of the matter
asserted or to prove that the asserter believed the assertion to be true, unless the
assertion is subject to cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered at the
trial at which it is offered, and (2) any conduct not intended to operate as an assertion
if it is offered to prove both the state of mind of such person and the external event or
condition which caused him to have that state of mind.
See also James, The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV.
788 (1940); Wheaton, What is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REv. 210-11 (1961).
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hand knowledge, whether the first-hand knowledge was experienced
in a discernible way, whether the statement accurately reflects what
was experienced in the past, or whether the statement was negli-
gently or intentionally misrepresented. In short, there is no ade-
quate way to test the perception, memory and sincerity of the
speaker. 0 Such evidence is generally excluded-not because it is
logically irrelevant, but because the dangers and unfairness in its
use outweigh its benefits." Such was the fate of evidence presented
in one of the hypothetical situations which was posed by Professor
Seidelson, and to which these comments are directed."
The defendant D is charged with the murder of his wife X. At
trial, the prosecution calls W, a practicing attorney, who repre-
sented the deceased in a separation action that was pending at the
time of her death. W is prepared to testify that, while X was in his
office the day before her death, X received a telephone call from D.
Attorney W recognized the defendant's voice when he answered the
telephone. During the conversation that occurred between X and D,
W heard X say: "No. . . please, no. . . you wouldn't kill me after
all these years . . . No, please don't say that . . . What would
happen to the children . . . They need a mother . . . Oh, please,
no. . . Don't say you'll kill me." The prosecutor wants to introduce
these statements and the statement the deceased made when she
hung up the phone, "I've got to get out of here. I've got to get away."
An objection to the use of the evidence is interposed by defense
counsel on the grounds that the statements are irrelevant and vio-
late the hearsay rule.
As the facts are posed, logical relevance standards are clearly met.
Once it is established through W's testimony that he recognized D
as being the caller, it cannot reasonably be denied that the state-
ments made by X tend to prove the consequential facts that D
threatened her and intended to kill her,' 3 which tend to prove that
D did kill X.11
The eventual admissibility of the statements, however, is a com-
10. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §478 (3d. ed. 1940); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177, 185-88 (1948); Strahorn, A Recon-
sideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 484, 485-86 (1937).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 262-63.
13. This assumes, of course, that the statements are found to be trustworthy, and there-
fore believable, by the finder of facts.
14. See note 6 supra. The consequential facts need not be the ultimate facts.
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plex problem since they fall within the definition of the hearsay
exclusionary rule." Their admissibility will now turn on whether the
evidence also falls within one of the numerous recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule, which have developed because extrinsic assur-
ances of trustworthiness are believed to exist when certain kinds of
hearsay statements are made, or when hearsay statements are made
under certain circumstances.'"
One such exception-the state of mind exception- admits hear-
say evidence when the statements reflect, directly or impliedly, the
present state of the declarant's mind, and such statements are of-
fered to prove that state of mind." The following diagrams will help
explain the reasons for this exception.
The hearsay concept is characterized in Diagram A as operating
in a circular fashion. The triangle, figure #1, represents the objective
facts. In Professor Seidelson's hypothetical situation it would repre-
sent D's alleged threats to kill X. The square, figure #2, represents
the experiencing of the objective facts by the declarant. In the case
under discussion it would represent the telephone conversation en-
gaged in by the deceased, X. The rectangle, figure #3, represents the
statements that were made about the experienced facts and which
are offered to prove the truth about that which was experienced and
expressed. Of course, the statements are being related in the court-
room by a third party, W in the assumed facts, who witnessed only
the making of the statements in figure #3. The statements are intro-
duced because of their tendency to prove the fact that D threatened
X and, therefore, killed her. The evidence is excluded under the
general hearsay rule because its value depends entirely on the per-
ception, memory and sincerity of the speaker, X, which cannot be
adequately explored by the finder of facts because she is no longer
available.
15. See notes 7, 8 and accompanying text supra.
16. E.g., declarations against interest, spontaneous declarations, and declarations made
in contemplation of death. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 9, §§ 276-98.
17. See generally id. § 294.
As to the development of the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, see generally
Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1934); Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind in Issue, 29 COLUM. L.
REV. 147 (1929); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State
of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283 (1929); Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-
Three Years After, 38 HARV. L. REV. 709 (1925); McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39
YALE L.J. 489 (1930); Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 568
(1946); Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224 (1961).
1976
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DIAGRAM A
Figure #3
Statements about
Objective Facts
The statements in figure #3 about the objective facts are offered
to prove the truth of what they state (the contents of figure #1).
Therefore, the flow returns to figure #1.
As a contrast to the logical theory of the basic hearsay problem,
Diagram B illustrates the theory of the state of mind exception. To
factually illustrate the principle, however, we must alter the hypo-
thetical so as to make X the defendant for allegedly killing her
husband; the rest of the facts remain the same. If the defense of self-
defense were asserted by X, the statements she made during and
Vol. 14: 219
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immediately after the telephone conversation with her husband
would be offered to prove that she feared for her life and, therefore,
may have acted in her own defense in killing her husband. If the
case arises in a jurisdiction which recognizes the defense of self-
defense when one actually believes that his/her life is in peril, even
though that belief may be unreasonable,'" the statements would be
admissible.'" It is irrelevant that the statements may not fairly and
accurately reflect what the husband said and meant during the
conversation. They are not offered to prove actual threats. They are
important because they tend to reflect how X interpreted what was
said and meant. Under this interpretation of the defense of self-
defense, the state of mind of the defendant is of central import-
ance-independent of whether the basis for it is actually true. This
is illustrated in Diagram B.
Although the wife's statements relate facts about the threats,
they are relevant because they tend to prove what the wife believed
both when the statements were made and later when she killed her
husband." Under the substantive law of self-defense, this state of
mind has independent significance-independent relevance. The
fact that the wife's mental state may have been based on inaccurate
facts, either in that threats were not made, or if made, were not
intended, is irrelevant. If she believed her life to be endangered
when she killed her husband, she is not culpable.
A real problem is now posed. The contemporaneous out-of-court
statements of the defendant are technically hearsay when related in
court for the truth of their content by a third party-but without
that evidence, the finder of facts may reject, out of hand, the de-
fense if its success must rely solely on the self-serving testimony of
the accused. Coupled with this necessity for the evidence is the fact
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), reflecting a minority
view, requires only that the actor "believe" that the use of force is necessary. The theory
behind the proposal is that "there should be no conviction of a crime requiring intentional
misconduct of one who is guilty only of negligence in making the unreasonable mistake." See
also W. LAFAVE & A. ScO'r, CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 394 (1972).
19. The definition of self-defense which is generally recognized requires that the de-
fender's belief that he was in danger of imminent harm be reasonable. See W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 393-94 (1972). If such a definition were employed here, the
hypothetical case, as changed, would pose exactly the same hearsay problem as that posed
in the original hypothetical with the husband as defendant. Since the reasonableness of the
wife's response could only be evaluated if statements made by the husband were proven, the
wife's utterances would have to be used for that purpose.
20. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
1976
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DIAGRAM B
Figure #2
Declarant's
Personal Ob-
--- Servation or
Eiperience
\V
Fighre #3
Statements akout
Objective Facts
The statements in figure #3, about the objective facts in figure
#1, are not offered to prove the truth of what they directly as-
sert. Even though the state of mind of the declarant, figure #2,
may have been caused by the facts in figure #1, the statements in
figure #3 are offered to prove the truth about the existence of
the state of mind of the declarant, which they impliedly assert.
Therefore, the flow returns to figure #2.
/Figure #1
Objective
Facts
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that there is no better evidence available of one's subjective state
of mind than that person's spontaneous or contemporaneous objec-
tive characterizations of it, assuming, of course, that those charac-
terizations are sincere. Therefore, if it can be shown that circum-
stances surrounding the utterances gave assurance of sincerity, and
if memory problems are avoided by their spontaneous or contempor-
aneous nature, courts will assume, with some obvious risk, that the
declarant accurately perceived his state of mind and will admit the
evidence.2
Returning now to the hypothetical as originally posed, where the
husband is being tried for the death of his wife, the question of
whether the wife's statements are admissible under the state of
mind exception to prove D threatened to kill her remains unan-
swered. Professor Seidelson suggests that the statements should fit
within this exception because exhaustive circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness make the statements "secondarily" relevant to
prove the state of the wife's mind, which circumstantially proves the
objective fact that caused the state of mind."2 Diagram C illustrates
the flow of this logic.
In his analysis Professor Seidelson ignores a basic limitation of the
state of mind exception, which he had previously acknowledged.23
It is essential to the application of this exception that the state of
mind of the declarant have independent relevance. That is to say,
the existence of the state of mind must either be an issue in the
cause of action, 4 or circumstantially tend to prove the cause of its
21. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
("the determination that a statement is hearsay does not end the inquiry into admissibility;
there must still be a further examination of the need for the statement at trial and the
circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness surrounding the making of the statement");
Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208 (1889) (such declarations must be "made
with no apparent motive for misstatement"); Hall v. American Friends Serv. Comm., Inc.,
74 Wash. 2d 467, 445 P.2d 616 (1968) (state of mind declarations must be shown to have a
"circumstantial probability" of trustworthiness).
22. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 262, 276.
23. Id. at 262.
24. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (answers
to survey questions showing that the declarant mistakenly believed that an unmarked ciga-
rette lighter was a particular brand); Casey v. Casey, 97 Cal. App. 2d 874, 218 P.2d 842 (1950)
(statements of declarant made after conveyance offered to establish whether the conveyance
was intended as a gift or in trust); In re Newcomb's Estate, 92 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950 (1908)
(declarations in letter showing testatrix's intent to make the city of New Orleans her perma-
nent home offered to establish domicile); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Linton, 141 S.W. 129 (Tex.
Civ. App. 191) (declarant's statements of mental suffering offered to prove damages for
mental anguish).
1976
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DIAGRAM C
II
Figure #3
StAtements iabout
Objective Facts
L . . . . . . . ;
Although the purpose for the use of the statements in figure #3 is to
prove the truth of the facts asserted therein [see DIAGRAM A], it is
argued that they do so indirectly by proving the state of the declar-
ant's mind about those facts, which, in turn, is circumstantial evi-
dence that the facts are true.
Vol. 14: 219
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existence, a fact which is in issue.25 In either instance the import-
ance of the state of mind is dependent upon the facts giving rise to
it. Neither instance requires a belief in the truth of the foundation
of the state of mind. The reason for this limitation is made apparent
in Diagram C.
Although the statements by the wife tend to prove the threats by
her husband-and if used directly for that purpose would be ex-
cluded as hearsay, since their value depends upon the untested, and
therefore, unmeasurable perception, memory, and sincerity of the
speaker" 6-they also tend to prove what she was thinking about
those threats at the time the statements were made."1 The state-
ments, if offered to prove the speaker's state of mind which they
reflect, would be hearsay, but admissible under the state of mind
exception if the substantive law of the action gave it independent
significance.28 Under the substantive law of this homicide case, how-
ever, the state of the wife's mind does not have independent signifi-
cance, but is only significant if used as a tool to admit evidence
which if offered directly would be inadmissible.
Professor Seidelson argues that this evidence is nevertheless ad-
missible under the exception because of its secondary significance
in circumstantially tending to prove the fact that her husband ac-
tually did threaten her.29 This reasoning, however, does not avoid
25. Smith v. Slifer, 1 Cal. App. 3d 748, 81 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1969) (declarant's statement
that she intended to pay for automobile ride was offered to prove that such payments were
actually made); Maryland Paper Prods. Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 557, 139 A.2d 29 (1958)
(declarations of deceased that he intended to stop off on the way to work to pick up a gear
wheel were offered to prove that he picked up the wheel).
If a statement reflects the present state of mind of the declarant, the state may be relevant
and necessary to prove facts that either precede or follow the existence of the state. See, e.g.,
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)(where a statement of present intent was
held admissible to prove continued intent and consequent doing of the intended act); In re
Anderson's Estate, 185 Cal. 700, 198 P. 407 (1921) (where a statement of present fear of
beneficiaries in the declarant's will was held admissible to prove the existence of fear at an
earlier time when the declarant was living with the beneficiaries and had executed the will).
It should be noted that in all cases where a state of mind is offered as circumstantial
evidence of another fact, the fact to be proven is one over which the declarant has control or
is intimately involved. The statements are not useable under the state of mind exception to
prove an objective fact observed by the declarant.
26. Professor Seidelson would, however, disagree that these values are immeasurable. See
Seidelson, supra note 1, at 260-61.
27. If the statements were made under conditions of apparent sincerity, they are the best
and most accurate evidence available. Under the facts of the hypothetical situation, sincerity
would not be a necessary inquiry.
28. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 294, at 694.
29. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 264-65.
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the trustworthiness problems that exist if the statements are used
to directly prove the threats. Since the state of the wife's mind only
has significance to the extent that it accurately reflects what the
husband did, new perception and memory problems are added. We
now must be concerned not only with the speaker's perception in
accurately knowing her own mental state, but also with her ability
to have reliably experienced that which gave rise to the state of
knowledge. With memory, we now have a problem that did not
previously exist with contemporaneous statements that had
independent relevance-accuracy in remembering what preceded
and caused the state. In effect, nothing has been gained by the
logical circumlocution. Unresolved problems of perception and
memory are identical to those of the basic hearsay statement that
is excluded.
If, by disregarding the independent relevance limitation of this
exception, we ignore these perception and memory problems, we
destroy the entire hearsay concept by consuming it within the ex-
ception. 0 This happens because virtually every sincere statement
that is uttered reflects the state of mind of the speaker concerning
the facts about which he speaks. If sincere statements about the
existence of that state of mind, without more, are acceptable proof
of the truth of the facts which the mind possesses, there is nothing
to which the hearsay rule could apply. The concept that underlies
the hearsay rule, the need for demonstrable trustworthiness, is de-
stroyed because it is ignored.
The Professor's analysis, however, does not go quite so far. He is
aware of the additional perception and memory problems which, if
ignored, would destroy the hearsay concept, and he addresses them
through a theory which he calls "'secondary' relevance." The sub-
stance of the theory is that when the reliability of the statements is
clear from circumstances surrounding their utterance, the state-
30. The exclusion of "statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered
or believed" is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which
would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement,
to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced
the state of mind.
FED. R. EVID. 803(3), 28 U.S.C.A. App. (1975) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed
Rules).
See also Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. Cm. L. REV. 394, 421-23
(1934); Maguire, The Hillman Case-Thirty-Three Years After, 38 HAxv. L. REV. 709, 719-
31 (1925).
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ments should be admissible. Since the statements of the wife, in our
hypothetical situation, were uttered almost simultaneously with the
occurrence of the objective facts, which they tend to prove, the
memory problem is virtually non-existent. Likewise, since the par-
ties involved were married, that intimate relationship would give
them special capacities to understand the import of the other's
words; therefore, perception problems are minimized.
The first problem raised by this "'secondary' relevance" concept
is that it is a misnomer. The issue of logical relevancy, whether
primary or secondary, is a threshold question that must be re-
solved before additional evidentiary problems can be dealt with. In
the absence of logical relevance, the evidence would be summarily
rejected. Upon establishing the probative worth of a statement (i. e.,
that it logically tends to prove a consequential fact), evidentiary
considerations, for hearsay purposes, turn to measurable probative
worth as reflected in the trustworthiness and reliability of the evi-
dence concerned. Although the Professor's characterization of the
problem as one of " 'secondary' relevance" may be inaccurate, it
does not appear to reflect the nature of his concern since the possi-
bility of factual error (trustworthiness) was decisive to him on the
issue of relevance.
The second, and more important problem, relates to the devastat-
ing impact which this interpretation of the state of mind exception
would have on the hearsay rule if accepted. Since his interpretation
could require a decision to be made in each case with regard to the
total reliability of the offered hearsay statements (reliability both
in the sense that they accurately reflect what was believed and in
the sense that the belief accurately reflects what was perceived), the
hearsay concept will not be destroyed. Yet the very fact that a
conscious decision may have to be made with regard to each hearsay
issue accomplishes the equally deleterious result of emasculating
this exception to the hearsay rule by abolishing its predictability.
Every such hearsay issue would be subject to a judgmental decision
based on the demonstrated reliability of the statements. This would
not only impair the ability of practitioners to prepare for trial but
would also tend to encourage and prolong litigation.
Some may find the demonstrated trustworthiness of the evidence
in Professor Seidelson's hypothetical situation to be compelling,
thereby making an exception to the hearsay rule appropriate. As it
has been shown, however, it cannot reasonably be argued that state
of mind is the appropriate exception.
1976
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While it is possible that an established exception may not be
available, this should not preclude the courts from creating new
exceptions where the ends of justice will be best served. 3' It is when
courts fail to recognize this authority, by failing to recognize that
the rules are themselves court-made, that they place themselves in
the position of having to torture and stretch the principles of estab-
lished exceptions to reach the "good result" in the "hard case. '32 It
was with this recognition that Congress approved the flexible provi-
sions of rules 803(24) 33 and 804(b)(5) 31 of the new Federal Rules of
31. One of the leading cases adopting this philosophy is Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). A lower court decision admitting a fifty-
eight-year-old newspaper article regarding a courthouse fire in 1901 was affirmed. The court
of appeals refused to rest its decision on the "business record" or "ancient document" excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. Instead it admitted the evidence on the basis of the two common
sense principles of necessity (unless the hearsay is admitted, the benefit of the evidence may
be lost entirely) and probability of trustworthiness (circumstances surrounding the statement
insure its reliability). See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 351. See also Zippo Mfg. Co.
v. Rogers Imports, Inc. 26 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), supra note 21.
32. Many commentators have endorsed the proposition that the hearsay rule must remain
flexible enough to avoid having to torture and stretch the principles of established exceptions.
However, there is disagreement as to whether such flexibility should take the form of numer-
ous new exceptions or be embodied in a single, broadly-construed "residual exception." See
Cross, The Scope of the Rule Against Hearsay, 72 L.Q. REv. 91, 115-16 (1956); Maguire, The
Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741, 774 (1961); McCor-
mick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 512 (1938); Weinstein, Probative Force
of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331, 354 (1961).
33. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) provides:
Other exceptions.-A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particu-
lars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
34. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) is identical in wording to FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
As originally proposed, these two provisions provided for admission of any hearsay state-
ment not specifically covered by any of the stated exceptions, if the statement was found to
have "comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." See FED. R. EvID. 803(24),
28 U.S.C.A. App. (1975) (Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 93-1277,
Note to Paragraph (24)).
In this abbreviated form the House Committee on the Judiciary rejected the sections
because of the belief that their flexibility "injected too much uncertainty into the law of
evidence regarding hearsay and impaired the ability of a litigant to prepare adequately for
State of Mind Exception
Evidence. Those provisions allow the introduction of hearsay state-
ments which do not fit within the specifically enumerated common
law exceptions, if circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
equivalent to those of common law exceptions, are shown to exist.
Hard cases sometimes make bad law only because we refuse to
recognize that we have made new law. The stretching of concepts
is a common phenomenon in the law, but some concepts are without
elasticity. When it comes to the state of mind exception, and its
limitation that only states of mind that have independent relevance
are admissible, there is no play. It is the skeletal foundation of the
exception that is essential to the preservation of the hearsay rule
itself.
trial." FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 28 U.S.C.A. App. (1975) (Conference Committee Notes, House
Report No. 93-1597, Note to Paragraph (24)).
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary disagreed with the total rejection of a residual
hearsay exception, believing that without a separate residual provision that provided for a
broader construction and interpretation of the rules, "the specifically enumerated exceptions
could become tortured beyond any reasonable circumstances which they were intended to
include (even if broadly construed)." FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 28 U.S.C.A. App. (1975) (Notes
of Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 93-1277, Note to Paragraph (24)). With
limitations on the use of the provision, the latter view prevailed.
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